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References eoo..*o.*.o*o.ooo*oooooo*oo.o29ON THE  RELEVANCE  OUF  CORLD  AGRICULTUIRAL  PICRS *
by
Yair  Mundlak  and  Don  Larson
Introduction
1.  Agricultural  products  are on the  whole  tradables  and  every  country
trades  in some  agricultural  products. In the  absence  of intervention  it is
expected  that domestic  prices  of such  products  will vary  with  world  prices.
However,  it is vell known that agriculture  is subjected  to considerable
intervention  which creates  a  gap between  world and domestic  prices,  and
generates  cross-country  variations  in agricultural  prices. Therefore,  it is
often claimed that world prices are irrelevant  for  the development  of
agriculture  in  countries  which  intervene  in  the  pricing  of their  agricultural
products.
*  The authors  are  grateful  to  Ronald  C.  Duncan  and  D.C.  Johnson  for  comments
and  suggestions  on  an earlier  draft.-2-
2.  It  to  true that intervention  affects the relationship  between
domestic  and  world  prices. Interventions  in agriculture  are  well  documented
and it is rare to find  a country  which  does  not intervene  (see  for  esample,
McCalla, 1969; Johnson 1973; Bale  and  Lutz, 1981; Australian  Bureau of
Agricultural  Economics,  1985;  Anderson,  Hayami  and Honma,  1986;  World  Bank
1986).  The discussion  on intervention  deals  primarily  with the effect  of
policies  on domestic  prices  and the consequences  for domestic  production,
consumption  trade,  welfare  and the spill  over to the world market.  Such
policies  are costly  and therefore  the reasons  for their  implementation  are
discussed  as well.  There  are basically  two approaches  to the  reasoning  of
government  policies. The first  one considers  policy  to be endogenous  within
the  economic  system. Examples  of this  approach  are: Bullock,  1989;  Rausser
and !reebairn,  1°74;  Rau  ser and  St^nchouse,  1978;  Shei  and  Thompsoor,  1977.
The second one treats  policies  within  a  broad framework  where political
pressures  play a dominant  role  and therefore  the response  of government  to
changes  in the economy  are strongly  hindered  by political  considerations.
Examples  of this approach  to agricultural  policy  are: Abler,  1987;  Gardner,
1987;  Miller,  1986;  Binswanger  and  Scandizzo,  1983.
3.  In this  paper  we ask  a different  question;  to  what  extent  are  world
prices transmitted  to  domestic  prices?  This is a  crucial topic for
understanding  the  relationships  between  domestic  and  world  markets. It is  of
particular  interest  in studying  the  dynamics  of world  agriculture  (Mundlak,
1989).- 3 -
4.  The  insulation  of  a country  from  world  prices  requires  resources.  As
the  gap  between  domestic  and  world  prices  increases,  the  cost  of such  policies
increases  accordingl.y  and  eventually  becomes  excessive. Hence,  it leads  one
to believe  that  the  gap  is  bounded  and  if this  is  the  case  then  we should  see
a transmission  of world prices  to domestic  prices.  This is the working
hypothesis  to be tested  in this  paper.  Its  implication  is discussed  in the
concluding  section.
The  Framework
5.  The simple  framework  draws  on the  (relative)  law  of one  price  where
the  domestic  price,  P, is expressed  as a product  of the  world  price,  P ,  the
&niGizal  exchanSag  rate, E,  nd the tax policy S  I  (  't), where  t  4  rthe  tAx
rate.
P  =  p*ES  (1)
This formulation  assumes  that the product  is homogeneous  in that  world  and
domestic prices refer to the same product;  marketing  margins and  other
domestic  non-tradable  inputs  are  ignored. This is  an unrealistic  assumption
and any interpretations  should  be modified  accordingly. We return  to this
below.  At present  it is  assumed  th  t the  systematic  components  of the  non-
tradable  inputs  are  confounded  in E and  S whereas  a disturbance  U is  added  to
account  for  the  transitory  component.  Rewriting  (1),  with  lower  case  letters
indicating  logs,  we have  for  commodity  i in  year  t:-4-
*
p  -p  +e  + s  +  u  . (2)
it  it  t  it  it
Let  the  relative  difference  in  prices  be d  p - p*  and  refer  to  z - e +  a  as
the  policy  variable,  then
it  it  it  W)
2  *
where u - (O,  a ),  and  B(zu) - E(p  u)  0.
6.  Given  the  stochastic  identity  (2'),  the  elasticity  of  domestic  prices
with respect  to world  prices  depends  on the  relationship  between  z and p*,
z(p*).  For example,  where  government  actions  reduce  fluctuations  in world
prices  z'(p*)  c  0.  At this  point,  we introduce  the linear  (in  parameters)
;Cr.ion  for  z(t*'  arA  re'e-  to  it  a-  L*e policy  equation;
*  *
Z-  =  I  +  Ep  +  v  ,  where  E(p  v) - O.  (3)
it  0  it  it
7.  The  empirical  relationship  between  domestic  and  world  prices  is  given
by the regression  coefficient  of p on p*, referred  to as the elasticity  of
domestic  price  with  respect  to  world  price:
b  =  *  E*  2  (4)
b  EZ  pitpit  /  Pit
and  by the  correlation  coefficient  of  the  two  prices. The  summation  in (4)  is
over comodities and time  and  the variables  are measured  as deviations  from
their  overall  means. As  explained  below,  the  variables  are  unitless.Using  (3),  the  expected  value  of b is  evauated:
E(b  - I)  - E(EE  dt p  /  LE  p.  )  (5)
it  it  Pit
8.  When the policies  are independent  of the  world  prices,  b will be
nearly  1. On the  other  hand,  b is  smaller  than  1  when  the  policies  reduce  the
fluctuations  in world prices  and larger  than 1 in the opposite  case.  The
closer  b is  to 1, the  more  closdly  domestic  prices  reflect,  on average,  world
prices. The quantitative  importance  of world  prices  in the  determination  of
domestic  prices  is  measured  by  the  contribution  of p* to  the  variations  in p.
This  is  represented  by the  degree  of  fit,  (R 2), of  the  regression  of p  on p*.
Empirical  Results
Data
9.  The elasticity  parameter  b was estimated  for 58 countries  for the
period  1968-78:  the  sample  covered  some  60 products. The  number  of products
varied  by countries. Products  not produced  in a country  were  excluded  from
the  analysis.
10.  The  domestic  prices  are  FAO  prices  described  by FAO  as:
"Farm  prices  are  in  theory  determined  by farm  gate  or  first  point-of-
sale transaction  when farmers  participate  in their capacity  assellers  of their  own  products.  Of course,  data  may  not  always  refer
to the  same  selling  points  depending  on the  prevailing  institutional
set-up  in the countries. Also different  practices  may prevail  in
regard  to  individual  communiAies."  1/
11.  The  domestic  prices  are  converted  from  local  currencies  to US  dollars
using  exchange  rates  (annual  averages)  published  by  the  IMP. The  world  price
is an export  unit  value  calculated  in nominal  US dollars. It is a ratio  of
the total  world  value  of exports  for  each  of the  commodities  divided  by the
total  world  exported  quantities  for  the  corresponding  comodities.
12.  Note that in this study the domestic  prices  are expressed  in US
dollars,  or as P/E in terms  of (1).  However,  there  may be a difference
between  the  exchange  rate  used in converting  prices  from  domestic  currencies
to dollars  and between  the  "true"  rate.  Therefore  E in (1),  or e in (2)  is
viewed  as a correction  factor  for  the exchange  rate  and is unitless. With
this interpretation,  the policy  variable  z is unitless. It represents  the
proportional  deviation  of  domestic  prices  from  world  prices. Also,  note  that
the deviations  of P it from their  mean (p*0.)  are unitless.  They simply
represent  the  log  of  the  proportional  change  in  prices.
1/  FAO  Production  Yearbook,  1987.-7
Table  1:  ELAST!'ITY  OF PRODUCER  PRICE  WITH  RESPECT
TO WORLD  PRICES
WITHIN  BETHEEN
COUNTRY  POOLED  I  t  it  I  t
Arigentina  0.966  0.759  0.990  0.551  1.000  0.794
Australia  0.930  0.847  0.933  0.486  0.944  0.907
Austria  0.979  0.790  0.991  0.106  1.009  0.902
Bangladesh  0.715  0.630  0.710  0.074  0.731  0.748
Belgium-Lux.  0.972  0.824  0.981  0.290  0.997  0.929
Brazil  0.902  1.097  0.847  0.316  0.865  1.268
Burundi  0.862  0.579  0.884  0.128  0.901  0.667
Cameroon  0.890  0.865  0.867  0.147  0.894  1.030
Canada  0.999  0.797  1.018  0.316  1.033  0.8&'
Chile  0.878  0.641  0.920  0.490  0.929  0.67,
Colombia  0.922  0.648  0.944  0.017  0.972  0.
Costa  Rica  0.908  0.659  0.933  0.417  0.946  O0;.
Cyprus  0.925  0.831  0.927  0.425  0.942  0.900
Denuark  1.037  0.944  1.033  0.208  1.055  1.080
Ecuador  0.987  0.719  1.012  0.244  1.036  0.816
Egypt  1.208  0.964  1.231  0.123  1.271  1.102
El Salv^dor  0.903  0.759  0.904  0.213  0.926  0.891
Finlan  0.967  0.636  0.998  -0.051  1.023  0.789
France  0.949  0.846  0.951  0.340  0.967  0.930
Germany  F.R.  ).989  0.751  1.001  0.183  1.024  0.902
Greece  (.912  0.846  0.908  0.208  0.925  0.948
Guatemala  0,907  0.697  0.924  0.309  0.940  0.799
India  0.737  0.438  0.775  0.173  0.795  0.503
Ireland  1.022  0.809  1.033  0.150  1.050  0.934
Israel  0.972  0.798  0.995  0.397  1.010  0.877
Italy  0.909  0.690  0.942  0.296  0.960  0.754
Japan  0.942  1.142  0.883  -0.008  0.909  1.347
Kenya  1.064  0.750  1.091  0.294  1.112  0.858
Korea,  Rep.  0.921  0.997  0.894  0.231  0.910  1.097
Malawi  0.888  0.488  0.923  -0.057  0.950  0.607
Malaysia  0.858  0.836  0.846  0.358  0.862  0.958
Mauritius  1.041  0.989  1.033  0.378  1.048  1.117
Mexico  0.985  0,654  1.036  0.373  1.055  0.724
Netherlands  0.985  0.C16  0.999  0.166  1.020  0.923
New  Zealand  1.029  0.7;4  1.051  0.134  1.068  0.858
Norway  0.977  0.807  0.977  0.012  1.005  0.977
Pakistan  0.744  0.362  0.803  0.004  0.829  0.437
Panama  0.937  0.603  0.965  0.213  0.963  0.720
Peru  0.868  0.803  0.861  0.124  0.880  0.958
Philippines  0.804  0.577  0.825  0.238  0.844  0.675
Portugal  0.959  0.814  0.960  0.185  0.981  0.948
South  Africa  0.972  0.626  1.005  0.147  1.028  0.721
Spain  0.928  0.821  0.931  0.326  0.947  0.914
Sri-Lanka  0.814  0.686  0.827  0.588  0.833  0.706
Sweden  0.930  0.581  0.966  0.021  0.989  0.772
Switzerland  1.039  1.051  1.018  0.111  1.037  1.198
Syrla  0.978  0.872  0.977  0.108  1.002  0.992
Tanzania  0.977  0.765  0.989  0.233  1.013  0.889
Thailand  0.897  . 774  0.891  0.130  0.918  0.939
Trinidad  1.015  0.876  1.020  0.364  1.035  1.026
Turkey  0.952  0.904  0.943  0.265  0.961  1.000
United  Kingdom  0.95.  0.796  0.962  0.405  0.975  0.891
United  States  1.00'  0.815  1.027  0.596  1.040  0.862
Uruguay  0.796  0.730  0.800  0.427  0.809  0.776
Venezuela  0.910  0.603  0.939  0.043  0.966  0.726
Yugoslavia  1.011  0.851  1.020  0.111  1.041  0.951
Zambia  0,893  0.720  0.905  0.326  0.916  0.787
Zimbabwe  0.956  0.698  0.97k  0.023  0.994  0.834a8-
Pooled.  Country  Results
13.  As the  policy  variable  is unitloss,  it is possible  to pool  the  data
over  all  commodities  for  all  years. The  estimates  of the  elasticity  b for  the
poolvd  data ap-ar  in column  1 of Table 1.  The elasticity  varies  between
0.715  and  1.208  with  a median  of  0.945. The  values  for  35  out  of 58  countries
fall in the  range  of 0.9-1.0. The implication  is  that  x,  the  elasticity  of
domestic  prices  with resx.i..  to the  policy  variable,  has a median  value  of
-0.055  (1  minus  0.945)  which  is  indeed  very  small.
14.  The conclusion  is that world prices  are transmitted  to domestic
prices. This  is  a qualitative  finding.  The  quantitative  aspect  is  related  to
th9  importance  of ::^Ch  tran;mission.  It  is  to be noted that in all
regressions  the values  of R2 are quite  high.  This indicates  not  only that
world  prices  are  transmitted,  but  that  they  also  constitute  a major  component
of the  variation  of domestic  prices.
Decomposition  by  Sources
15.  The  policy  equation  (3)  assumes  a uniform  policy  for  all  commodities
and all years.  This  assumption  may be too strong  and should  therefore  be
examined.  This can be done by generalizing  (3).  This is done by first
assuming  that  the policy  varies  by commodity. In this  case,  the assumption
E(p  v)  =  0  made  in  (3)  is  violated.  Therefore  (3)  is  rewritten:-9-
*
Z. = W; +  (I  +  w  )Pip  + v's  (3i)
it  0  u  it
*  *
where  E(p  v')  =  0,  and  cov  (wiPi  )  0, for  all  t.
The  error  term,  v',  is  now  defined  in  accordance  with (3i)  and,  therefore,  it
is amsumed to be orthogonal  to p . The extension  in (3i)  allows  for a
commodity-specific  deviation,  wi.  A direct  way  to  estimate  the  importance  of
this  extension  is  to  compute  the  between-commodity  regression.  Letting
1
p  =  - Z  p  ' the commodity-price  average  over  time,  the between  commodity
T  it 
regression  coefficient  is:
*  * 2
b(i)  =  Z  p  p  /  £  p  (4i)
1.* 1.  I.
Eilb(i)  -1]  =  w  + A (i,  (5i)
where  A(i)is  a  weighted  average  of  wr,  so  that
I
h(i) =  ZEl  X,  and  =  (P*;2  2  (6)
The values  obtained  for  b(i)  appear  in  column  5 (bet%ien  i)  cf  Table  1.  The
differences  between  these  results  and  the  pooled  results  are  negligible.  The
median is 0.975,  as compared  with 0.945  for the pooled  regression. Thus,
roughly  speaking,  the  average  value  of wi  is  0.03.  It can  then  be  concluded
that either  w.  are generally  small,  or else they differ in signs and
therefore  their  weighted  avera!,R  is  nearly  zero. We return  to  this  below.- 10  -
16.  A similar  analysis  follows  for an alternative  specification  which
allows  for  systematic  variations  of policy  overtime.  In  this  case,
z  =  Ne +  (1  +  I  )  pi  +  V"I  (3t)
it  0  t  it  it,
where E (p*v")  =  0  and cov (t  P*it)  =  0 for all i.
Defining  p.  =  - E  Pi  as  the commodity-average  price, the  between-time
regression,  with  variables  again  written  as  deviations  from  their  means,  is:
*  *  2
b(t)  =  Ep  p  Izp  (4t)
.t .t  St
and
E [b(t)  -11 =  1  +  A(t),  (5t)
*2  *2
where  h(t)  - Ew A ,  and  X  = (p  )  /£(p )  ,a weighted
t  t  t  et  .t
average  of  X 
t
17.  The results  are reported  in column  6 of Table  1.  There is now a
larger  spread  in  country  results. This  may  reflect  the  fact  that  the  sample
consists  of eleven  years  only,  and  therefore  the  estimates  of the  between-time
regression  are  less  precise  than  those  of  the  between-commodity.  Nevertheless,
for  most countries  the  results  do not  differ  much  from  the  pooled  regression.
The  median  value  of b(t)  is .905. Consequently  the  average  estimate  of  t is
approximately  -0.04,  similar  in  magnitude  and  sign  to  that  of wi.- 11  -
18.  The policy  equation  can  now be extended  to allow  for  both  commodity
and  year  effects. Combining  3i  and  3t:
*
it  0  i  t  it  it
*  *  *
where E(p  v...)  =  0; cov  (i,  p  it)  cov (  VP it  O0 for  all  iit.
19.  Finally,  an  interaction  term,  witpit, can  be  added  to zit, with  the
assumption  that the covariance  of wit  with  pit  is  zero.  This will add
additional  terms  to  the  expectations  of the  two  between-regressions.  However,
in  the  present  case,  this  addition  is  quantitatively  unimportant,  as we shall
see  below.
Technical  Digression
20.  The foregoing  analysis  differs  somewhat  from  more  familiar  forms  of
analyzing  panel  data. We therefore  turn  now  to evaluate  the  results  within  a
uniform  framework.  The reader  who is interested  only with the empirical
results  can skip  this  discussion  and  move  directly  to the  next  section. Let
W, B(i), B(t), W(i), and W(it) be projection  (symetric and idempotent)
matrices  that generate  residuals. They can be defined  in terms  of their
operation  on  an  arbitrary  vector  x  of order  IT:
Wx =  (sit  - x..),  B(i)x  =  (xi.  - x..),  B(t)x  =  (x.t  - x..),
W(X  =  (Kit  xi.),  W(t)s  =  (xit  - x.d) W(it)s  - (sit  - xi. - x.  + x.)- 12  -
The bracketed  parentheses  contain  the typical  elements  of the vectors in
question.  The  following  identities  can  then  be  derived.
W =  Wti)  + B(i)  (7a)
=  W(t) + B(t)  (7b)
=  W(i) + W(t) - w(it)  (7c)
B(i)  + B(t)  +  W(it)  (7d)
21.  Let p and  p* be the  vectors  of the  two  prices,  then  the regression
coefficients  obtained  above  can  be  derived  from:
a  =  p*Ap  /  p*Ap*.  When A  =  W,  B(i),  B(t),  the  resulting  estimators  are b
(pooled),  b(i) (between  commodity)  and b(t) (between  time) respecrively.
Also,  when  A =  W(i),  W(t)  and  W(it),  the  coefficients  can  be referred  to as:
within  commodity,  w(i),  within  time,  w(t), and within  time and commodity,
w(it),  respectively.  Let  A  and  C be  two  arbitrary  matrixes  and  define:
r(A/C)  =  p*Ap*  /  p*Cp*.  (8)
It then  follows  that:
b  =  r[B(i)/W]  b(i)  + r[B[t)/W]  b(t)  (9)
+ [1  - r(B(i)/WJ  - r[B(t)/WI  w(it)- 13  -
where,  in view  of (8),  r[B(i)/WJ  and  r[B(t)/WI  are  the  ratios  of the  between
comodity and  between  time  variances  to the  total  variance  of p*  respectively.
Table  2 presents  a decomposition  of the  sum  of squares  of p*  by sources. As
p* is world  price,  the  sums  of  squares  should  be the  same  for  all countries.
However,  the  set  of commodities  analyzed  varies  somewhat  between  countries  and
therefore  the  numbers  in  the  table  differ  accordingly.  Taking  Argentina  as an
example, r[B(i)/WI  =  481.5/562.8  =  .856,  r[B(t)/Wl  =  69.8/562.8  =  .124.  Thus,
the  between  commodity  variance  dominates  the  other  components.  Also  note  that
1 - r[B(i)/Wl  - r[B(t)/WI  =  .02,  implying  that  there  are hardly any variations
left  in  the  world  prices  after  the  time  and  commodity  effects  were  eliminated.
Consequently,  using  the  values  in Table  1, it is  possible  to approximate  the
pooled  regression  with .856b(i)  +  .124b(t)  = .954,  as compared  to  the  actual
value of  .966 for the pooled  regression. The difference  is due to the
interaction  term  that  was neglected. It then  follows  that  under  the  present
framework,  the  expected  value  of  the  pooled  regression  is:
E[b  - 1]  a  r  +  r[B(i)/WI  A(i)  +  r[B(t)/W]  h(t)  (10)
that is, the  deviation  from 1 (perfect  transmission)  consists  of an overall
deviation  (X), and  a weighted  average  of commodity  effects  and  time  effects,
and  they  are  all  relatively  small.
22.  Table  1 also  reports  the  within  estimators.  Allowing  for  commodity
effects  yields  the  within  commodity  estimate  (column  2).  Their  median  value
is about .78  which is somewhat  lower  than that of the pooled  regression.
Allowing  for  time  effect  results  in  the  within  time  estimates  (column  3)  with- 14  -
Table  2:  SUM OF SQUARES OF WORLD  PRICES
Pooled  Within  Between  Check  t
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)
Country  (Total)  (i)  (t)  (it)  (1)  (t)
Argentina  62.8  81.3  493.0  11.5  481.5  69.8  0.0
Australia  511.0  75.1  446.6.  10.6  436.0  64.5  0.0
Austria  426.4  57.2  373.2  7.7  370.4  53.4  -0.3
Bangladesh  401.2  62.9  349.3  11.0  338.3  51.9  0.0
BelgiumrLux.  414.7  58.9  358.6  9.2  357.6  56.8  -0.7
Brazil  576.0  91.8  499.3  17.5  483.6  77.0  -0.3
Burundi  385.4  46.1  346.8  7.5  339.3  38.6  0.0
Cameroon  475.8  63.6  418.7  13.0  413.0  57.9  -0.8
Canada  370.0  53.1  323.6  6.6  316.9  46.4  0.0
Chile  386.1  68.8  325.1  9.8  318.7  61.1  -0.1
Colombia  538.3  82.3  469.5  13.5  456.1  68.8  0.0
Costa Rica  442.4  59.2  390.4  11.5  384.1  52.4  -0.4
Cyprus  363.2  56.0  310.7  7.8  309.8  53.0  -0.4
Denmark  297.1  48.5  249.5  7.9  250.9  48.3  -0.8
Ecuador  542.9  83.4  473.6  14.1  459.5  69.3  0.0
Egypt  369.1  75.3  304.4  10.6  293.8  64.7  0.0
El Salvador  457.3  64.7  401.3  12.5  393.2  56.5  -0.4
Finland  273.2  39.6  235.3  6.2  235.0  38.4  -0.4
France  459.2  69.2  399.2  9.9  388.7  60.1  -0.1
Germany  429.8  55.6  375.0  10.3  371.9  56.7  -2.0
Greece  507.6  78.5  439.7  10.9  427.6  68.0  -0.1
Guatemala  437.6  58.9  386.1  11.2  379.2  51.9  -0.4
India  519.8  84.0  449.0  15.1  436.6  70.9  -0.1
Ireland  296.2  35.1  268.1  5.8  268.5  28.1  -0.1
Israel  404.6  72.5  338.3  10.9  330.5  67.1  -0.7
Italy  453.3  84.5  377.8  11.0  370.0  75.6  -0.1
Japan  562.8  78.4  494.6  12.6  486.5  68.3  -0.1
Kenya  430.2  70.3  471.1  12.9  459.8  59.2  -0.1
Korea, Rep.  482.4  63.0  425.1  7.8  424.7  57.7  -0.4
Malawi  375.8  50.1  334.7  9.0  325.8  41.1  0.0
Malaysia  446.4  58.2  394.3  13.1  390.3  53.0  -0.9
Mauritius  301.9  36.0  272.1  6.3  265.9  29.8  0.0
Mexico  522.9  92.6  440.5  14.8  433.2  82.8  -0.4
Netherlands  322.3  56.1  269.1  7.5  268.7  53.6  -0.4
New Zealand  400.1  51.5  355.3  6.7  348.6  44.8  0.0
Norway  274.5  38.8  236.1  6.9  234.6  39.6  -1.3
Pakistan  411.6  75.2  346.2  11.6  337.2  65.5  -0.1
Panama  320,5  40.2  286.7  8.4  280.5  34.0  -0.2
Peru  556.7  90.0  483.0  16.9  462.6  74.3  -0.5
Philippines  445.0  65.4  388.9  13.2  377.8  57.1  -1.0
Portugal  516.6  69.9  453.9  12.2  448,0  63.2  -0.5
,Sourh  Africa  525.9  72.8  465.1  12.1  453.1  60.7  e.
Spaiua  568.2  85.8  493.2  13.6  483.0  75.4  -0.O
Sri-Lanka  443.6  57.3  396.0  9.7  386.3  47.6  0.0
Sweden  365.1  53.2  310.5  10.7  315.1  56.4  -1.7
Switzerland  351.6  46.5  310.8  6.4  301.3  41.0  -0.2
Syria  397.4  71.8  335.9  9.7  325.6  61.7  -0.1
Tanzania  535.0  78.2  469.3  14.5  457.3  65.8  -0.1
Thailand  404.4  58.5  357.6  11.9  348.3  47.3  -0.5
Trinidad  388.6  47.6  345.3  10.9  341.8  44.1  -0.8
Turkey  455.6  78.6  387.2  10.2,  377.0  68.4  0.0
United  Kingdom  341.8  45.9  298.6  8.2  292.1  44.2  -1.1
Uruguay  383.0  65.0  326.5  8.5  318.0  56.5  0.0
United  States  528.0  81.5  457.8  13.2  445.8  70.5  -0.3
Venezuela  420.8  64.3  367.0  11.3  355.0  53.9  -A.1
Yugoslavia  488.1  76.7  420.6  9.2  411.4  67.5  0.0
Zambia  400.9  47.8  363.6  7.6  359.7  37.3  01.1
Zimbabwe  426.0  54.1  378.8  8.8  372.0  47.3  -0.1- 15  -
a median  value  of .955  which  is  almost  equal  to that  obtained  for  the  pooled
regression.  However,  allowing  jointly  for  the  two  effects  gives  very  low,  and
in some cases even negative,  elasticities. The question  is what is the
relationship  between  these  various  estimates.  The  answer  is  given  in  terms  of
the  identities  in  (7a)  to  (7d)  above. For  inetance,
w(i)  =  pW(i)p*  /  p*W(i)p*  =  b  +  [b  - (b(i)]  r[B(i)/W(i)]  (11)
and
E(w(i)]  =  (1 +  w) - r[B(i)/W(i)J  a(i)  (12)
To illustrate,  using  the  values  for  Argentina  taken  from  Tables  1  and  2:
b  =  .9656,  b  - b(i)  =  -.0344  and  r[B(i)/W(i)] =  481.6/81.3  =  5.92.
Substituting  these  values  in (11)  results  in the  value  reported  for  w(i) in
Table  1.  1/ Thus,  the  reason  that  the  within  commodity  estimator  differs  from
the pooled  estimator  is largely  due to the ratio  of the two variances  in
question  rather  than due to the difference  between  b and b(i).  A similar
expression  can  be  obtained  for  w(t)  and  w(it). The  latter  is  of a particular
interest  because  of its  big  variance  with  the  other  estimates.  To illustrate
this  point,  write:
1!  The  results  are  reported  here  with  more  decimal  points  than  in  Table  1. A
minor  discrepancy  still  exists  due  to  rounding  errors.- 16  -
w(it)  =  pW(it)p*  /  p*W(it)p*
=  b +  [b  - b(i)l r[B(i)/W(it)J  +  lb  - b(t)j  r[B(t)/W(it)1  (13)
and  therefore,
Ejw(it)J =  (1  +  n) - a(i) rlB(i)/W(it)J  - A(t)  r[B(t)/W(it)J  (14)
Although  A(i)  and  A(t)  are relatively  small,  the  r's  are large. In the  case
of Argentina, r[B(i)/W(it)J  =  41.87 and r[B(t)/W(it)]  =  6.07, b - b(i) =
-. 03443  and b - b(t) =  .176.  Using  these  values  in (13)  gives,  aside  from
rounding  errors,  the  value  of  w(it)  presented  in  Table  1.
Additional  Results
23.  As indicated  earlier,  A(i)  is estimated  by the  difference  b(i)  - b.
A reference  to Table  1 indicates  that,  for  most  countries,  this  difference  is
rather  small. By way  of summary,  the  difference  between  the  median  values  of
b(i) and b is .03,  which  is small  relative  to the  reference  point  of unit
elasticity.  This by itself  does not imply  that the individual  in(i)s  are
small. They  may  be  numerically  large  but  of opposite  signs. To  shed  light  on
this point  the  analysis  has  to be conducted  for  a smaller  set  of commodities
as  well  as  for  individual  commodities.
24.  It  is often stated that staple foods are more susceptible  to
intervention  which insulates  domestic  markets from world prices.  Also,
commodities  which are traded  under some sort of cartel  arrangements  are- 17  -
expected  to  show a  larger gap in the variations  of domestic  and world
prices.  It is therefore  of interest  to analyze  such  commodities. Table  5
presents  country  results  for  individual commodities based  on  11
observations: wheat,  coffee  and cocoa.  For wheat,  the median  value is
approximately  0.65,  and only 8 out of the 58 countries  had a coefficient
smaller  thsn  0.5. The  median  value  for  coffee  is  0.68;  for  cocoa  it  is  within
the  range  of 0.84-0.93. The conclusion  is that  the  policy  elasticities  for
these  commodities  are negative,  but  on the  whole  they  are  modest  and  by and
large  world  prices  are  well  transmitted.
Pooled  Country  Data
25.  There  is another,  not independent  question:  to what  extent  does the
world  price  used here represent  the  domestic  country  price.  This is not a
trivial  question. Recall  that  the  world  price  is  the  export  unit  value  and  as
such it is not an average  of domestic  pricer.. After all, world trade
constitutes  only a  small fraction  of world production. To examine this
question,  the  regression  is  estimated  with  all  countries  pooled  together.  The
analysis  is greatly  simplied  when the sample  is balanced,  in the  sense  that
there  are  no missing  observations.  As not  all  countries  grow  the  same  crops
every year, a subsample  was selected  which  consists  of 17 commodities,  18
countries  and  ll  years,  altogether  3366  observations.  In such  an  analysis  the
individual  countries  serve  as repeated  observations,  because  they  all  face  the
same  world  price  Pit, for  commodity  i in  year  t.  The pooled  elasticity  for
this  sample  is .976,  with  R2  =  .729.- 18  -
Table  3:  CEREALS  ONLY: ELASTICITY OF PRICE WITH RESPECT TO
WORLD  PRICES
WITHIN  BETWEEN
COUNTRY  POOLED  I  t  it  i  t
Argentina  0.870  0.911  0.859  0.160  0.865  0.967
Australia  0.975  0.975  0.973  0.743  0.975  0.992
Austria  0.916  0.742  0.926  -0.045  0.932  0.799
Bangladesh  0.685  0.876  0.245  -0.084  0.268  0.908
Belgium-Lux.  0.696  0.714  0.678  0.714  0.694  0.887
Brazil  0.786  0.901  0.426  0.231  0.453  0.960
Burundi  0.682  0.686  0.684  0.830  0.675  0.680
Cameroon  0.909  1.142  0.034  0.031  0.282  1.474
Canada  0.919  0.988  0.907  -0.018  0.913  1.067
Chile  0.650  0.949  0.537  2.103  -0.336  0.704
Colombia  0.558  0.672  0.302  0.508  0.286  0.677
Costa  Rica  0.572  0.596  0.543  0.646  0.509  0.592
Cyprus  0.645  0.657  0.296  0.280  0.653  0.864
Denmark  0.849  0.980  0.201  0.222  0.202  1.131
Ecuador  0.613  0.774  0.172  0.132  0.175  0.796
Egypt  0.483  0.739  -0.083  0.109  -0.098  0.761
El Salvador  0.642  0.613  0.548  0.074  0.711  0.738
Finland  0.596  0.592  0.318  0.017  0.621  0.718
France  0.812  0.751  0.814  0.108  0.820  0.798
Germany,  F.R.  0.827  0.708  0.829  0.251  0.839  0.813
Greece  0.791  0.840  0.779  0.088  0.785  0.896
Guatemala  0.685  0.693  0.579  0.325  0.654  0.759
India  0.489  0.608  0.190  0.283  0.206  0.645
Ireland  0.949  0.895  0.947  0.065  0.955  0.986
Israel  0.608  0.878  -0.253  0.722  -0.533  0.881
Italy  0.630  0.708  0.378  0.096  0.396  0.757
Japan  0.908  1.227  0.863  0.063  0.870  1.312
Kenya  0.805  0.834  0.644  0.129  0.729  0.895
Korea  Rep.  1.681  1.035  0.634  0.349  0.640  1.133
Malawi  0.633  0.400  1.004  -0.070  1.079  0.418
Malaysia  0.757  0.682  0.774  0.380  1.008  0.771
Mauritius  0.648  0.879  0.000  -0.112  0.011  0.917
Mexico  0.668  0.773  0.394  0.238  0.380  0.792
Netherlands  0.615  0.671  0.204  0.060  0.336  0.778
New  Zealand  0.031  0.733  1.051  0.043  1.058  0.788
Norway  0.604  0.638  0.176  -0.130  0.447  0.803
Pakistan  0.246  0.311  0.221  0.741  0.077  0.262
Panama  0.371  0.583  -0.123  0.181  -0.196  0.622
Peru  0.716  0.751  0.599  0.373  0.620  0.764
Philippines  0.430  0.613  -0.016  0.190  -0.131  0.625
Portugal  0.844  0.657  0.856  0.062  0.866  0.746
South  Africa  0.881  G.611  0.906  0.046  0.913  0.652
Spain  0.879  0.718  0.892  0.196  0.898  0.756
Sri  Lanka  0.729  0.830  0.508  -0.136  0.547  0.864
Sweden  0.460  0.517  0.238  0.021  0.307  0.625
Switzerland  0.864  1.114  0.838  0.177  0.842  1.188
Syria  0.905  0.859  0.962  0.282  1.014  0.878
Tanzania  0.755  0.819  0.525  0.216  0.602  0.887
Thailand  0.720  0.941  0.362  1.055  0.176  0.927
Trinidad  0.648  0.738  0.223  0.121  0.343  0.836
Turkey  0.923  0.809  1.115  -0.178  1.231  0.843
United  Kingdom  0.879  0.844  0.877  0.422  0.880  0.897
United  States  0.925  0.909  0.925  0.749  0.927  0.914
Uruguay  0.686  0.918  0.167  0.655  0.130  0.926
Venezuela  0.666  0.755  0.475  0.164  0.496  0.777
Yugoslavia  0.922  0.807  0.930  0.807  0.936  0.846
Zambia  0.872  0.680  1.126  0.680  1.271  0.721
Zimbabwe  0.803  0.592  1.114  -0.008  1.313  0.650- 19  -
Table  4:  VEGETABLES  ONLY:  SUMMARY  TABLE  FOR  WITHIN  AND
BETWEEN  COEFFICIENTS
WITHIN  BETWEEN
COUNTRY  POOLED  I  t  It  i  t
Argentina  1.027  0.740  1.176  0.356  1.213  0.770
Australia  0.706  0.921  0.466  0.082  0.496  0.994
Austria  0.951  0.868  1.017  0.802  0.966  0.854
Bangladesh  0.551  0.468  0.573  -U.171  0.631  0.524
Belgium,  Lux.  1.182  1.052  1.311  1.135  1.325  1.046
Brazil  1.319  1.294  1.270  -0.099  1.333  1.418
Burundi  0.826  0.360  1.083  0.234  1.117  0.369
Cameroon  0.988  0.906  0.993  0.114  1.033  0.977
Canada  0.657  0.697  0.587  0.193  0.619  0.742
Chile  0.977  0.539  1.350  0.277  1.434  0.561
Colombia  1.068  0.659  1.246  -0.350  1.319  0.740
Costa  Rica  1.065  0.601  1.243  0.459  1.271  0.614
Cyprus  1.006  0.958  1.041  0.736  1.067  0.974
Denmark  1.223  1.136  1.292  1.092  1.308  1.139
Ecuador  1.148  0.809  1.295  0.067  1.345  0.865
Egypt  1.194  0.994  1.331  0.216  1.419  1.053
El  Salvador  0.824  0.935  0.729  0.013  0.761  1.017
Finland  1.225  0.773  1.522  0.419  1.606  0.808
France  1.000  0.825  1.191  0.849  1.220  0.823
Germany,  F.R.  0.840  0.944  0.769  0.610  0.773  1.048
Greece  0.964  0.844  1.035  0.234  1.098  0.890
Guatemala  1.187  0.632  1.394  -0.202  1.455  0.704
India  0.735  0.507  0.858  0.505  0.875  0.507
Ireland  0.544  0.937  0.275  0.674  0.249  0.961
Israel  0.826  0.720  0.919  0.386  0.934  0.734
Italy  0.792  0.838  0.726  0.559  0.740  0.859
Japan  1.370  1.158  1.427  -0.026  1.493  1.290
Kenya  0.553  0.475  0.566  -0.205  0.601  0.530
Korea,  Rep.  0.954  1.015  0.815  -0.054  0.926  1.188
Malawi  0.433  0.309  0.462  -0.347  0.493  0.365
Malaysia  0.236  0.803  0.023  -0.490  0.038  0.918
Mauritius  1.132  1.256  1.008  -0.047  1.057  1.363
Mexico  0.898  0.661  1.005  0.031  1.099  0.762
Netherlands  1.307  1.012  1.528  0.250  1.634  1.074
New Zealand  0.207  0.544  -0.095  -0.146  -0.091  0.608
Norway  1.320  0.838  1.612  0.237  1.715  0.899
Pakistan  0.365  0.328  0.342  -0.508  0.408  0.389
Panama  0.939  0.529  1.091  0.254  1.122  0.553
Peru  0.966  0.838  0.991  -0.279  1.049  0.923
Philippines  0.930  0.676  1.054  0.681  1.071  0.676
Portugal  0.981  1.046  0.853  -0.019  0.959  1.175
South  Africa  0.891  0.580  1.111  0.282  1.175  0.608
Spain  0.972  0.929  0.972  0.495  1.002  0.975
Sri  Lanka  0.782  0.665  0.802  -0.182  0.847  0.741
Sweden  1.110  0.599  1.364  0.176  1.380  0.703
Switzerland  0.994  0.960  0.983  0.182  1.047  1.016
Syria  0-825  0.814  0.794  0.250  0.841  0.851
Tanzania  1.130  0.968  1.185  0.337  1.224  1.022
Thailand  0.798  0.354  0.987  -0.293  1.046  0.412
Trinidad  0.882  1.084  0.798  0.349  0.811  1.150
Turkey  0.851  0.970  0.651  0.264  0.684  1.016
United  Kingdom  1.086  0.887  1.196  0.937  1.247  0.918
United  States  0.596  0.832  0.375  0.270  0.373  0.909
Uruguay  0.405  0.485  0.292  -0.152  0.327  0.541
Venezuela  0.730  0.820  0.654  0.094  0.679  0.885
Yugoslavia  0.726  0.920  0.491  0.585  0.483  0.945
Zambia  0.766  0.759  0.788  1.169  0.770  0.726
Zimbabwe  0.752,  0.580  0.805  -0.132  0.848  0.644- 20  -
Table  5:  ELASTICITY  OF PRODUCER  PRICES  WITH RESPECT  TO
WORLD  PRICES  FOR SELECTED  COMMODITIES






Brazil  O.E1396  0.65206  1.1923
Burundi  0.51779  0.67989
Cameroon  1.15186  0.53017  0.61456
Canada  0.95447
Chile  0.83626
Colombia  0.62013  0.61911  0.61176
Costa  Rica  0.55367  0.94008  1.07543
Cyprus  0.47708
Denmark  0.89237
Ecuador  0.52851  0.62852  0.97872
Egypt  0.56167





Guatemala  0.6868  0.86177  0.97473





Kenya  0.77996  1.00593
Korea,  Rep.  0.90314
Malawi  0.50035  0.42954
Malaysia  1.00846  0.83695  0.84433
Mauritius  0.69214
Mexico  0.58558  0.85832  0.83584
Netherlands  0.58419
New  Zealand  0.70093
Norway  0.60052
Pakistan  0.09736
Panama  0.49686  0.42537  1.02345
Peru  0.70418  0.73226  1.04622
Philippines  0.60916  1.01799  0.75422
Portugal  0.42215
South  Africa  0.45356
Spain  0.5463  0.55763




Tanzania  0.63865  0.61596  0.49762
Thailand  0.9951  0.46107
Trinidad  0.72659  0.60366  0.70243
Turkey  0.70537
United  Kingdom  0.70782
United  States  0.95847  0.83133
Uruguay  1.15293
Venezuela  0.80533  0.05066  0.50441
Yugoslavia  0.62647
Zambia  1.18678  0.71453
Zimbabwe  0.62393  0.43381- 21  -
26.  A  similar  analysis  for subsets  of commodities  gives the following
elasticities  for  the  pooled  regressions,  with  R2 reported  in the  parentheses:
cereals  .839  (.86),  vegetables  .933  (.61),  oilseeds,  .963  (.70),  fruits  .700
(.70),  beverages  .729  (.73),  fibers  .719  (.73),  tobacco  .599  (.86),  livestock,
.980  (.71).
27.  Turning to individual  commodities,  with the number of countries
follow  the  R2 in  the  parentheses,  the  results  are:  rice  .692  (.83;  45),  barley
.770  (87;  49),  maize  .820  (.86;  58),  rye  .810  (.89;  39),  oats  .796  (.88;  51),
millet  .853  (.89;  34), sorghum  .858  (.82;  45),  wheat  .693  (.85;  58),  rubber
.518  (.82;  10),  sugar  .199  (.87;  54).
28.  A potential  problem  of any  emLpirical  application  is that  the  results
emerging  from the study  reflect  the idiosyncrasies  of tha  way in which the
data  are  collected,  estimated  or reported  rather  than  the  underlying  economic
effects.  This possibility  is inherent  in applied  work and can never be
eliminated. However,  in an effort  to check  for  results  that  are  consistent
and independent  of the  underlying  data source,  the  procedure  described  above
was repeated  on a  separate  data set.  Tables  6 through  8 report  results
obtained  by repeating  the  procedure  on  25 years  of  producer  prices  in  the  EC-
10 as published  by Herlihy  et. al. (1989).  Producer  prices  for barley,
butter,  cattle,  cheese,  eggs, maize,  milk, oats,  pork, poultry,  pototoes,
rice,  rye, sugarbeets,  and  wheat  are included  in the  dati. Country  coverage
includes  Denmark,  France,  Greece,  Ireland,  Italy,  the  Netherlands,  the  United
Kingdom,  and  West  Germany. In  addition,  Belgium  and  Luxembourg  are  treated  as
a single  region. Pooled EC-aggregate  results  are reported, as  well. The- 22  -
Table  6:  ELASTICITY  OF PRODUCER  PRICES  WITH  RESPECT  TO
WORLD  PRICES FOR THE EURO'EAN  COMMUNITY
b  Standard  Adjusted
Country  (pooled)  Error  T-Score  R-Squared
Belgium/Luxembourg  0.979  0.023  42.78  0.85
Denmark  0.957  0.019  49.76  0.88
France  1.009  0.021  48.85  0.87
Germany  F.R.  0.956  0.021  45.21  0.86
Greece  0.988  0.020  49.65  0.90
Ireland  0.909  0.029  30.93  0.81
Italy  0.991  0.020  49.51  0.87
Netherlands  0.935  0.022  42.96  0.85
United  Kingdom  0.957  0.019  51.28  0.89
EC  Average  0.967  0.007  134.16  0.86I"  R  ii  fi  .
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Federal
Re~~~~k  lk~~~dtai  iloEb
CxhrDdity  ltmoug  Demirk  France  of Cermny  Greece  Irelmd  Italy  ltbherlaii  KlzWIm  Gmdty
Barley  0.71435  0.97215  0.69096  0.68419  0.63153  0.87775  0.71782  0.76180  0.86865  0.76880
Butter  0.52201  1.10116  0.60682  0.73629  0.71555  0.65394  0.87974  1.07247  0.786C0
Cattle  0.95788  1.19329  0.88884  0.98713  0.82901  1.1050B  0.87287  0.91107  1.02313  0.97425
heese  0.92142  1.28692  0.84411  1.02179  0.77285  0.83674  1.03998  1.11623  0.980m0
FgpS  0.63558  0.91878  1.19786  0.78698  0.73947  0.78471  0.54785  0.76204  0.63434  0.77862
Maize  0.68343  0.85417  0.76880
Mflk  1.18823  1.7'128  1.23026  1.39492  0.66893  1.55054  1.39304  1.31213  1.17299  1.29359
Oats  0.77850  0.99771  0.71647  0.75335  0.74656  0.84547  0.77350  0.71949  0.81865  0.79441
Pigs  0.72207  0.81864  0.57090  0.75415  0.76728  0.64235  0.73252  0.73517  0.71788
1tu1try  0.95483  0.95039  0.60383  0.87973  0.41084  0.74830  0.53365  0.93656  0.91322  0.77015
Potatoes  1.07921  1.10471  0.90602  0.90102  0.75519  1.01842  0.94985  1.01588  0.92297  0.96148
Rye  0.84387  0.91158  0.69711  0.82241  0.64540  0.84759  0.77341  1.05246  0.84759
S9arbeeta  0.74074  0.88504  0.79767  0.71826  0.62443  0.78962  0.79526  0.81790
Wheat  0.66116  0.90719  0.61932  0.72264  0.53690  0.6982C  0.77443  0.67367  0.89776  0.76830- 25 -
producer  prices  were originally  reported  in the domestic  currency  of each
country.  Official  exchange  rates  as reported  in the  same  publication  were
used to convert  the prices  to a dollar  denomination. World prices  were
derived by  dividing  world expo:t values by world export quantities  as
published  by  FAO.
29.  While  the  country  and  commodity  coverage  available  from  the EC data
is more limited  than in the original  data set, the EC data provide  an
interesting  and robust  check  on the findings. EC agricultural  policy is
active, well-financed,  and sophisticated  in its execution  and reporting
mechanisms.  Because  it is well-financed,  any wedge between  domestic  and
international  prices  could  be expected  to be more long-lived  than  in lower-
income  countries.
30.  The  results  in  Tables  6 and  7 confirm  the  earlier  results.  Although
the commodity  coverage  is different,  the pooled  elasticities  for countries
common to  both  samples are  remarkably  similar.  The  producer price
elasticities  for the  EC countries  in  Table  1 range  from  0.91  to 1.04,  while
the  elasticities  of Table  6 range  from  0.91  to 1.01. The  adjusted  R2s range
from .81  to .90. As with  the  earlier  results,  the  commodity  and  time  effects
are small.  Prom  Table 7, the median  for b(i) is .978  as compared  to the
pooled result  of  .967,  yielding  a commodity  effect  (wi)  of 0.01.  The
absolute  value  of the time  effect  (11t)  is slighly  larger  at -0.08.  Within
commodity  and time effects  are reported  in Table 7 as well.  Again the
estimeted  values  are  consistent  with  results  from  the  larger  data  set. Table
8 provides  elasticities  for  individual  commodities.  The  results  for  wheat  can- 26  -
be  directly compared to  the  results  in  Table  5  which  were  obtained  from  the
larger  data set.  Again,  despite  different  sample  years,  the results  are
fairly  comparabls.
DISCUSSION
31.  What do the  results  show?  By way of generalization,  the  deviation
from  unitary  elasticity  is,  on the  whole,  surprisingly  small;  and  while  there
appear  to be some  differences  among  commodities  and commodity  groupings,  the
results  appear  quite  robust  regardless  of the  manner  in which  the data  are
pooled  or  disaggregated.
32.  The deviation  from unitary  elasticity  is in part due to policy
measures  and  in part due  to domestic  inputs  which are not necessarily
synchronized  with world agricultural  prices.  1/  This does not imply  that
policies  generated  with respect  to particular  products  are not important  in
affecting  the prices  of these products.  They certainly  affect  the price
levels  and whenever  a country  taxes agriculture  the domestic  prices  will
differ  from  world  prices. However,  the  question  which  is  of concern  to  us is
not  the  existence  of price  intervention  mechanisms,  but  rather  whether  or  not
these  mechanisms  move  systematically  with  world  prices. The  evidence  in this
paper  suggests  that  they  do not.
1/  For  an  analysis  of this  subject  see  Mundlak,  Cavallo  and  Domenech.- 27 -
33.  This  brings  up the  next  question: how  about  policies  which  are  not
related  to world  prices? These,  by  definition,  will  not  bias  the  coefficient
and a unitary  elasticity  will  be observed. What is then the  role  of world
prices  in this  case?  The  empirical  answer  is given  by the  degree  of fit  of
the  model,  that  is,  by  the  proportion  of  the  total  variance  of  domestic  prices
which  is  accounted  for  by  world  prices. The  values  are  relatively  high.
34.  The implication  of this  result  is that  technical  change  (and  other
shocks  of a more permanent  nature)  which  originate  in one  country  but  which
are big enough to affect  world prices,  eventually  affect prices in all
countries. The passive  countries,  which  are the shock  takers,  cannot  avoid
them for  very long because  it is too  costly  to do so.  Realizing  this  cost
limitation  to  an autonomous  policy,  it seems  more  reasonable  to use,  from  the
outset,  resources  to  implement  the  necessary  structural  adjustments;  including
the enhancement  of technical  change,  if this is the source  of the shock,
rather  than  to delay  the process  through  taxation.  This  is  certainly  a very
general  statement  and it  has to be properly  interpreted  when it comes  to a
particular  policy;  however,  it is mentioned  here in order  to put possible
implications  of the  analysis  within  a  broader  framework.
35.  Finally,  we consider  here  a large  number  of  commodities.  In  general,
the  trade  of a country  concentrates  only  in  a few  commodities,  while  trade  in
the  others may  be  totally unimportant.  The prices of  the non-traded
commodities  is  determined  by domestic  supply  and  demand  and  therefore,  on the
surface,  should  be independent  of world prices.  The explanation  for the
observed  dependence  is basically  an extension  of factor-price  equalization.- 28  -
The prices  of the traded  commodities  determine  the prices  of the specific
agricultural  resources  such  an land,  capital  and  labor  in the  country.
36.  To conclude,  even  though  domestic  policies  affect  prices,  they  cannot
prevent  the  covariations  of domestic  prices  with  world  prices  in the  long  run
and  therefore  do  not  change  the  developments  caused  by  fundamentals.  There  is
a simple  reason  for  it. Price  distortion  is  costly  and  public  resources,  just
like  private  resources,  are  finite.- 29  -
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